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PAGE 001
TOR: 021317Z FEB 83

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FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE ADELMAN
THE HAGUE/BRUSSELS FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY

USINF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, INF

SUBJECT: (U) GLITMAN CONVERSATIONS WITH DETINOV, MEDVEDEV
AND KVITSINSKIY

1. THIS IS INF MEMCON A-333. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MEETING DATE: JANUARY 28, 1983

. TIME: 8:00 P.M.

. PLACE: RECEPTION AT GLITMAN RESIDENCE

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

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1) Read this one!

2) Probably should provide to C/NIC

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STATE

83 0415359 850

PAGE 002

NC 0415359

TOR: 021317Z FEB 83

. AMBASSADOR MAYNARD W. GLITMAN AMB. Y. KVITSINSKIY
 . MR. JOHN WOODWORTH (WHO JOINED MR. M. DETINOV
 . NEAR CLOSE OF CONVERSATION) MR. I. MEDVEDEV
 ATMOSPHERE

3. KVITSINSKIY WAS CONFIDENT, MOCKING IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. "YOU HAVE PAINTED YOURSELF INTO A CORNER," HE SAID, IN RESPONSE TO BEING ASKED IF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ENVISAGED THE POSSIBILITY OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND LIMITS FOR THE U.S. AND USSR. "DON'T EXPECT US TO HELP YOU GET OUT." GENERAL DETINOV AND COLONEL MEDVEDEV WERE CONFIDENT AND UNBENDING. FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT OR EVEN EXPLORATION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS ONLY POSSIBLE ON THEIR TERMS: IF YOU ARE WILLING TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF OUR APPROACH, NUMBERS OF SS-20'S IN EUROPE CAN BE WORKED OUT.

4. (COMMENT: WHETHER REAL OR FEIGNED, THE SOVIETS GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY THINK THEY HAVE US ON THE ROPES. END COMMENT.)

SUBCEILING ON AIRCRAFT

5. IN RESPONSE TO GLITMAN'S QUESTION, DETINOV AND MEDVEDEV SAID THE SOVIET POSITION ON HOW AN AIRCRAFT SUBCEILING WOULD TIE INTO THE MISSILE SUBCEILING WOULD BE MADE CLEAR WHEN THE SOVIETS TABLE REVISIONS TO THEIR DRAFT TREATY ON FEBRUARY 1. THEY DENIED THAT RECENT ARTICLES IN THE SOVIET PRESS CONTAINED HINTS THAT A SUBCEILING ON AIRCRAFT MIGHT BE PROPOSED IN A CONTEXT OTHER THAN AN OVERALL REDUCTION OF MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT TO 300 "UNITS."

U.S.-SOVIET EQUALITY, SECURITY FOR NATO

6. DETINOV RESPONDED TO GLITMAN'S INSISTENCE THAT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR, INCLUDING AN INF AGREEMENT, MUST BE BASED ON EQUAL RIGHTS AND LIMITS

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

83 0415359 SSO

PAGE 003
TOR: 021317Z FEB 83

NC 0415359

BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BY INSISTING THAT THE SOVIETS MUST TAKE UK AND FRENCH FORCES INTO ACCOUNT. IN RESPONSE TO A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET AIM WAS TO BALANCE UK AND FRENCH FORCES OR TO BLOCK U.S. DEPLOYMENTS, AND WHETHER, HYPOTHETICALLY, THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT A RESULT IN WHICH THEY HAD MISSILE FORCES EQUAL TO US, UK AND FRENCH MISSILES, DETINOV RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED THE "LOWEST POSSIBLE" NUMBER OF MISSILES. THIS WOULD MEAN A USSR - UK/FRANCE BALANCE AND WOULD IN EFFECT LEAVE NO ROOM FOR THE U.S.

7. KVITSINSKIY WAS MORE DIRECT. THE ONLY POSSIBLE OUTCOME WAS ZERO FOR THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET MISSILES EQUAL TO UK AND FRENCH FORCES. THERE COULD BE NO COMPROMISE SANCTIONING U.S. INF DEPLOYMENTS, NO U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE IN INF MISSILES. WHEN WOODWORTH, WHO HAD JOINED THE CONVERSATION, COMMENTED THAT KVITSINSKIY SEEMED DETERMINED TO CLOSE OFF ANY ROUTE TO AN AGREEMENT, KVITSINSKIY MADE HIS REJOINDER ABOUT NOT HELPING THE U.S. GET OUT OF THE CORNER INTO WHICH IT HAD PAINTED ITSELF.

WARHEADS AS A UNIT OF ACCOUNT

8. DETINOV AND MEDVEDEV WERE UNWILLING TO BE DRAWN OUT ON REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO TAKE ACCOUNT

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OF WARHEADS IN THEIR CALCULATIONS OF THE BALANCE. THEY ~~WOULD NOT CONFIRM THE ACCURACY OF AN ARTICLE IN TRUD~~ WHICH ATTRIBUTED 340 WARHEADS TO UK AND FRENCH FORCES, NOR WOULD THEY COMMENT ON WHETHER THIS IN TURN WOULD MEAN THAT IN PLACE OF A 162 SS-20 FIGURE THE SOVIET SHOULD BY THEIR RECKONING HAVE OFFERED 112 SS-20'S. THEY SUGGESTED THAT IF THE U.S. WANTED TO RAISE WARHEADS AS A BASIS FOR COUNTING, THEY WOULD CONSIDER IT, BUT SAID THE SOVIET POSITION WAS BASED ON COUNTING LAUNCHERS. THEY SAID THAT IN CASE UK AND FRENCH WARHEADS WERE TO INCREASE --

SECRET

SECRET

STATE

83 0415359

SSO

PAGE 004

NC 0415359

TOR: 021317Z FEB 83

TRUD HAS THEM AT 600 BY 1985 AND 1200 BY 1990 -- THE SOVIETS WOULD BRING INTO PLAY THE RELEVANT CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES OF THEIR DRAFT TREATY.

9. KVITSINSKIY ALSO SAID THE SOVIET POSITION WAS BASED ON COUNTING LAUNCHERS AND ALSO ASKED IF THE U.S. WERE PROPOSING TO COUNT WARHEADS. HE WAS TOLD THAT UNDER O-O THE METHOD OF COUNTING WAS IRRELEVANT. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE WAS UNAWARE THAT BAHR HAD CALCULATED THAT ON THE BASIS OF WARHEADS THE SOVIETS SHOULD HAVE ONLY 50 SS-20'S TO OFFSET UK AND FRENCH FORCES. HE FLATLY REJECTED SUCH AN OUTCOME. WHEN ASKED WHAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DO IF THE U.S. AND THE USSR WERE TO SIGN A TREATY ALONG THE LINES THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED AND THE UK AND FRENCH WERE, AS THE SOVIETS HAVE PREDICTED, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS, KVITSINSKIY BLUNTLY SAID, SURE, WE'LL INCREASE TO THE SAME LEVEL AS THE UK AND FRENCH.

SS-20'S WITHIN RANGE OF THE US

10. WHEN ARGUING GLOBAL VERSUS REGIONAL LIMITS AND THE VALIDITY OF THE SOVIET CLAIM THAT SS-20'S EAST OF 80 DEGREES EAST COULD NOT STRIKE CENTRAL EUROPE, GLITMAN NOTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE SS-20'S MOBILITY, ITS RANGE MUST BE BASED ON THE LOCATION OF THE MAIN OPERATING BASE PLUS DISPERSAL TO FIELD SITES. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE NOTED THAT MOVING SS-20'S NORTH BEHIND THE 80TH DEGREE COULD BRING THEM INTO RANGE OF THE U.S. KVITSINSKIY REPLIED, "NOW YOU'RE GETTING SMART."

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END OF MESSAGE

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